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 Energy has always been the most crucial issue on the world’s 
political agenda and it is likely to remain so in the future. In recent years, 
changing dynamics of world politics has made the ‘energy security’ the 
number-one topic on the international relations. At theoretical level, 
dependency on one country for energy supply has been regarded as a 
leverage of one country over another. Thus, in this scope, diversification of 
energy suppliers has inevitably become a topic of academic and political 
discussions. As a result, diversification of not only energy suppliers but also 
energy routes has gained significance. In this sense, the diversity of energy 
transition routes is the essential part of the energy security issue (The IEA 
defines energy security as “the uninterrupted availability of energy sources at 
an affordable price”). This creates an opportunity for the countries like 
Turkey which occupy a geostrategic position to provide a secure 
transportation route by means of pipeline systems. At this juncture, this 
paper examines Turkey’s efforts and potentials in diversifying source 
country and automatically energy routes for the purpose of increasing the 
energy security. Thus, forthcoming sections of the paper will touch firstly 
upon why Turkey has still potential to be central gas hub because of geo-
strategic position. Then, alternatives source countries will be analyzed. 
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Introduction 
 Changing dynamics of world politics has made the ‘energy security’ 
the number-one topic on the international relations. At theoretical level, 
dependency on one country for energy supply has been regarded as a 
leverage of one country over another. Thus, in this scope, diversification of 
energy suppliers has inevitably become a topic of academic and political 
discussions. As a result, diversification of not only energy suppliers but also 
energy routes has gained significance. This creates an opportunity for the 
countries like Turkey which occupy a geostrategic position to provide a 
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secure transportation route by means of pipeline systems. Thanks to that geo-
strategic position, Turkey has been eager to be central gas hub and has 
sought to develop an energy security accordingly. Yet the international and 
regional developments have seemed to threat Turkey’s energy politics to be 
central hub, which requires a short historical background for better 
comprehension. 
 Increasing energy demand and the practices in diversification of 
energy sources (in the context of energy security) have led to natural gas 
gaining importance and priority in the last decades14. In this regard, energy 
security has increasingly become an accelerator of Turkey’s energy politics 
with a special emphasis on natural gas. Dependency of Turkey on Russian 
gas is obvious since that Turkey is dependent on Russia for almost 55 
percent of its natural gas. And to clarify, together with Turkey, Europe is, as 
being the biggest consumer of natural gas, also destined to use Russian gas. 
There were two separate operating pipelines to meet both consumers’ gas 
need. One was from Ukraine to Europe and another from Blue Stream to 
Turkey. After Russia annexed Crimea without international agreement 
Western block (the EU and the US) applied economic sanctions to Russia. 
As a reaction, Russia intended to supersede the South Stream with Blue 
streams which will be extended through Turkey and be called as Turkish 
stream. Under these international circumstances, Turkey took the advantage 
of it to realize its main energy politics to be central gas hub in the region, 
especially between Russia and Europe.  While meetings started to get an 
agreement on the Turkish stream, Syrian crisis changed the path of the game. 
Turkey downed the Russian warplane on the ground that it transgresses the 
Turkish airspace. Since that, Russia declared that current gas delivery will 
continue but Turkish stream project suspended. 
 In the light of this short history, Turkey itself seek for more options 
to reduce the dependency on Russian gas and did not abandoned its energy 
politics to be energy hub. That is where the main argument of the paper starts 
as Turkey reached out alternate suppliers in incredibly short time. Moreover, 
the most recent efforts to explore natural gas reserve in Mediterranean Sea 
by Cyprus, Israel and Egypt will probably serve to the Turkey’s energy 
politics despite disagreements between Turkey and them. That geostrategic 
position of Turkey locating between new potential suppliers and consumers 
is still applicable and Turkey preserves its political stability. Turkey’s energy 
politics to be central hub does still seem realizable with alternative energy 
rich-countries and routes. 
 
                                                          
14 Yuri F.,Makogon, S. A. Holditch, and T. Y. Makogon. "Natural gas-hydrates—A potential 
energy source for the 21st Century." Journal of Petroleum Science and Engineering 56.1 
(2007): 17. 
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Potential to be central gas hub 
 Thanks to the fact that it is located between major suppliers and 
consumers, Turkey can play a crucial role in the global energy arena. Turkey 
has sought to strengthen its position as an energy hub, aggregator and transit 
corridor in the region in the nearest future15. As it has been estimated by IEA 
(2014), by 2025 there will be 30 bcm of natural gas from Caspian area and 
70 bcm from Middle East reaching Europe by pipeline. Therefore , As stated 
by Arıbogan and Bilgin16, both the United States and the EU will need the 
cooperation of Turkey to include at least two of the energy rich countries - 
Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, and possibly Iran to the European energy supply 
house. The EU’s initiatives for the creation of alternative gas pipelines to 
bypass its energy dependency on the Russian natural gas resources17 have 
arisen Turkey’s geostrategic position through alternative pipelines from 
Caspian area. That argument has been practically proved especially after the 
Russian-Ukrainian gas crisis which has posed a threat on the EU’s energy 
security. To crystalize this argument, alike that the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan 
(BTC) pipeline carrying oil from the Caspian to the Mediterranean and 
eventually to the Europe,  and many other projects, including the Nabucco, 
natural gas can  be delivered through parallel pipelines as long as Turkey 
success in being central gas hub. It shows that, Turkey has an advantage of 
ready buyer. Through such initiatives, Turkey can not only obtain energy 
sustainability for itself, but also contribute to the global energy security. 
 European natural gas security of supply is highly dependent to 
Russia. Due to worsening security concerns about the potential disruption of 
energy supply, the strategic objective of diversifying sources and routes of 
energy supply" will be taken more seriously by European Union18. Given the 
history of gas conflicts between Russia and Ukraine, and the latest warplane 
crisis between Russia and Turkey on one hand, and recent war of mutual 
sanctions between EU and Russia, on the other, EU has to either reduce its 
gas consumption in future or find new reliable suppliers. In this regard, the 
Southern Gas Corridor project or alternative projects via Turkey can play an 
important role19. Here several exporters from Middle East and Caspian area 
will compete for the share in capacity, while Turkey may take an advantage 
of monopoly power in natural gas transition. 
                                                          
15 Mert Bilgin, "Turkey´ s energy strategy: What difference does it make to become an 
energy transit corridor, hub or center?" UNISCI discussion papers 23 (2010): 120. 
16 Ülke Arıboğan and Mert Bılgın. "New Energy Order Politics Neopolitics: From 
Geopolitics to Energeopolitics." International Relations/Uluslararasi Iliskiler 5.20 (2008). 
17 Zeyno Baran, "EU energy security: time to end Russian leverage." Washington quarterly 
30.4 (2007): 140. 
18Michael Ratner, et al. "Europe's Energy Security: Options and Challenges to Natural Gas 
Supply Diversification." Current Politics & Economics Of Europe 23 (2012). 
19 Bilgin, “Turkey’s Energy Sttrategy,” 121 
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 With the Crimea issue between Russia and Ukraine it can be claimed 
that the pressure over Russia have changed the topology of future transit 
routes, with replacement of South Stream via Turkey. And in the same coin, 
the willingness of Middle East and Caspian countries to export their gas to 
Europe has made Turkey the best alternative route as seen in the figure 
below; 
Source: Platt’s Energy Economist (2013). 
 
 Taking the case of TANAP (Trans-Anatolian Natural Gas Pipeline) 
as an example (showed in the figure) an essential component of a future 
southern gas corridor, TANAP would enable Turkey to become a major 
energy transit state. Turkey may become a significant energy hub (physical 
and/or trading) after substantial investments having been made to upgrade 
infrastructure20. Before December 2014, Russia was planning South Stream 
route with the capacity of 60 bcm/year. Due to primarily geopolitical tension 
with the West, Russia has decided to replace this route with Blue Stream-2 of 
similar capacity and has reached the preliminary unofficial agreement with 
Turkey. While this action practically and economically does not change 
anything for Russia, it does so for both Turkey and the EU. As can be seen 
again from the map, any challenges to the energy security bring Turkey into 
the mind when the subject is alternative energy routes, which also confirms 
the importance of geostrategic position of Turkey. 
                                                          
20 “Türkiye’nin Enerji Stratejisi”, accessed January 7, 2016. 
http://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkiye_nin-enerji-stratejisi.tr.mfa. 
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 In the meantime, as a result of the agreement on enrichment capacity 
of uranium21 between the US, the EU and Iran, Iranian gas resources could 
be used to meet the EU’s gas demand. Closeness of Turkey’s geostrategic 
position to alternative natural gas resources is crucial for transit path. For 
instance, Turkey has started to buy Iranian natural gas in the 1990s. In 2011, 
Iran supplied 8.4 bcm natural gas  for Turkey. In addition, there is a MoU 
(memorandum of understanding) which includes Turkey’s participation in 
South Pars gas production. That shows the potential of Turkey to diversify 
natural gas suppliers. These arguments especially on natural gas resources of 
Iran superseding Russian ones are still on the table. However, from the 
perspective of political stance on Syrian crisis they do not seem applicable in 
near future.   
 The dependency of both the Europe and Turkey on Russian natural 
gas gives Russia a strategic advantage over energy relations. In other words, 
Russia is capable of using energy wealth as economic and political leverage 
on the Europe and now on Turkey. Besides, the recent warplane crisis 
between Turkey and Russia has deteriorated Turkey’s long and short terms 
energy politics. Turkey has to meet its annual current natural gas needs, from 
more than 50 percent of it is being met by Russian natural gas resources. 
That leads us to the fact that Turkey itself is dependent on Russia. Thus it 
can be claimed that Turkey is moving too fast to form alternative energy 
routes, careless about its own energy dependency. To answer the claim, it 
should not be forgotten that Russia is already suffering from reduced oil 
prices which is speculated by the US and Saudi Arabia intentionally. In that 
case it does not seem possible that Russia can play its natural gas card 
against Turkey which is the second biggest buyer22 of Russian natural gas 
resources.  
 In sum, economic conditions of Russia due to western economic 
embargo will prevent Russia to play this card against Turkey. Despite 
warplane crisis Turkey’s geostrategic position resurfaced and proved its 
potential as right after the crisis Turkey managed to find alternative gas-rich 
fields such as Azerbaijan, Kurdistan Regional Government, Qatar and 
Eastern Mediterranean. Relying on that, the argument of Turkey’s potential 
to be energy hub is still intact. Yet it just can be argued that it is going to be 
delayed as such plan of Turkey requires massive infrastructure and long term 
                                                          
21 “The Historic deal that will prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon”, accessed 
January 8, 2016. https://www.whitehouse.gov/issues/foreign-policy/iran-deal.  
22  According to the latest statement made by Gazprom which is national gas company of 
Russia, Russia will keep its written promises in the previous signed agreements. “Gazprom: 
Türkiye'ye doğalgaz sevkiyatı normal şekilde sürüyor”, Hürriyet, 3 December 2015, 
accessed January 7, 2016. http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gazprom-turkiyeye-dogalgaz-
sevkiyati-normal-sekilde-suruyor-40022462.  
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negotiation which was already completed phases with Russia before the 
crisis. 
 
Alternative Source Countries 
 In a country which is willing to be an energy hub like Turkey, there 
needs to be big gas storage capacities, more than 20 percent of its annual 
consumption. According to the strategic plan of  Ministry of Energy and 
Natural Resources of Turkey for 2015-201923, there are plans to raise the gas 
storage capacity to 10 percent of the country’s annual consumption level by 
the end of 2019 and to further raise this to 20 percent in the long-term. 
However, Turkey has quickly entered into search for alternatives 
immediately after the plane crisis with Russia and it has made strategic deals 
with several energy-rich countries, including Qatar and Azerbaijan, and has 
been developing several energy projects to further diversify its energy 
sources. In this sense, the natural gas reserves in Northern Iraq and the 
Eastern Mediterranean can be seen as crucial alternative sources advancing 
the diversification of Turkey’s gas supply in the medium term. However, to 
diversify its energy supply through alternative routes Turkey essentially 
needs to construct a large scaled supply infrastructure (new pipelines and 
terminals, the solution of legal disagreements).  
 In Turkey’s pursuits of alternative source country, Azerbaijan first 
comes to mind due to rich natural gas resources. The Azerbaijan’s natural 
gas supply can be considered in the short term. Turkey receives annually 
around 6 bcm gas from Azerbaijan via the South Caucasus Pipeline. And 
Azerbaijan is also eager to become a high profile gas provider to both 
Turkey and Europe. The latest agreement24 between Turkey and Azerbaijan 
has settled the acceleration of TANAP and initiation of gas transfer in 2018. 
In line with these developments Turkey is planning to import an additional 6 
bcm from Azerbaijan at the end of 2018. In addition, with the completion of 
TANAP, Turkey expects to increase gas supply from Azerbaijan 
approximately 23 bcm by 2023, and 31 bcm by 2026. Despite such plans can 
be realized in medium term, Azerbaijan is one of the applicable options in 
Turkey’s energy politics. 
                                                          
23 T.C. Ministry of Energy and Natural Resources: Strategic Plan of 2015-2019, accessed 
January 5, 2016. 
http://www.enerji.gov.tr/File/?path=ROOT%2F1%2FDocuments%2FStratejik+Plan%2FET
KB+2015-2019+Stratejik+Plani.pdf  
24 “Turkey agrees with Azerbaijan to accelerate gas Project”, Hürriyet Daily News, 
December 3, 2015, accessed January 8,2016. http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/turkey-
agrees-with-azerbaijan-to-accelerate-gas-project-
.aspx?pageID=238&nID=92046&NewsCatID=348.  
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 In such a competitive gas market, Northern Iraq having around 5.7 
trillion cubic feet gas reserves is willing to be an important player by 
supplying gas to both Turkey and Europe. The warm relations between 
Turkey and Northern  Iraq have created opportunity to Turkey to diversify 
source country. Immediately after the Russian warplane crisis, officials from 
Iraq’s Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) announced25 that a plan has 
been drawn up to export natural gas to Turkey and therefrom to Europe. 
According to this plan, the government of Iraqi Kurdistan plans to deliver 
natural gas to Turkey by late 2016 and through Turkey, Northern Iraqi 
natural gas will be exported to Europe within three years. The region will be 
able to export annually 10 bcm gas to Turkey at the end of three years, and if 
everything goes right, by the early 2020, it is expected to reach 20 bcm.  
 In the diversification of natural gas supply the liquefied natural gas 
(LNG) can be considered as a potential source. The agreement26 signed with 
Qatar during the recent visit by the President of Turkey indicated Turkey's 
willingness to increase the respective portion of LNG in the natural gas mix. 
As Turkey’s strategic partner in the Middle East, Qatar is the largest exporter 
of LNG in the world and can supply high portion of LNG to Turkey. 
However, in that case Turkey needs to increase its storage capacity for LNG. 
But here, the critical issue of Turkey's LNG storage and regasification 
capacity pups into mind. According to the International Energy Agency, 
Turkey's LNG storage capacity covers around 3 bcm and the regasification 
capacity around 14 bcm. The current storage capacity supplies only 5 percent 
of Turkey’s national demand which is well below the levels of Europe’s 
demand ( 20 percent ). Therefore, both LNG storage and delivery 
infrastructure requires major investments that would need years to complete 
and huge numbers to finance.  
 The recent discoveries of a significant amount of natural gas in the 
Eastern Mediterranean have increased the options in diversification of source 
country in the international gas market as shown in the table below; three 
large fields have been discovered offshore both Israel and Cyprus between 
2009 and 2011. These three fields contain natural gas in total 1040 bcm. 
Moreover, the recourses discovered in the Zohr field ( an offshore natural 
gas field located in the Egyptian sector of the Mediterranean Sea) are 
currently estimated about 850 bcm. 
                                                          
25 “Iraq: KRG gas 'enough for needs of Turkey and Europe”, Anadolu Ajansı, accessed 
January 7, 2016. http://aa.com.tr/en/economy/iraq-krg-gas-enough-for-needs-of-turkey-and-
europe/482935.  
26 “Turkey, Qatar sign liquefied natural gas agreement”, Daily Sabah, December 2, 2015, 
accessed January 7, 2016. http://www.dailysabah.com/energy/2015/12/02/turkey-qatar-sign-
liquefied-natural-gas-agreement.  




 These recent developments have opened discussion about the 
relationship between regional geopolitics and energy. Many analysts have 
expressed hopes that the Eastern Mediterranean might become a gas-
exporting region. Moreover, this newly discovered gas sources could pave 
the way for a new era of cooperation which has potential to solve conflicts in 
the region. In parallel with this argument, the Israeli officials’ 
announcements27 about gas supply to Turkey just after the Russian warplane 
crisis, gave reason to be optimistic about future energy cooperation. In fact, 
despite the ongoing political crisis, the trade between Israel and Turkey has 
reached an all-time high at 5.44 billion dollars in 201428. And also several 
Turkish companies such as Zorlu Group and Turcas have enhanced some 
initiatives for construction of pipeline transporting natural gas from the giant 
Leviathan field to the Turkey29. It can be claimed that, this commercial 
factors can induce Turkey a quite pragmatic approach due to energy politics. 
In this context, the Eastern Mediterranean gas can be one of Turkey’s 
options in the diversification politics.    
 
Conclusion 
 It is obvious that Turkey initiated a clear-cut project to be a central 
gas hub due to the fact that its geo-strategic location being right between 
major gas-rich areas and consumers. As being the biggest gas supplier, 
Russia was an inevitable actor within this project. As it was the case till their 
                                                          
27 “10 bcm of Israeli gas planned in first phase of Turkey deal”, Today’s Zaman, December 
18, 2015, accessed January 8, 2016. http://www.todayszaman.com/business_10-bcm-of-
israeli-gas-planned-in-first-phase-of-turkey-deal_407384.html. 
28 “Turkey-Israel relations: a political low point and an economic high point,” Brookings 
Institution, 19 February 2015, accessed 8 January, 2016. 
http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/markaz/posts/2015/02/19-israel-turkey-trade-business-
economy.  
29 “10 bids for Leviathan export tender to Turkey,” Globes, 23 March 2014, accessed 
January 8, 2016. http://www.globes.co.il/en/article-10-bids-for-leviathan-export-tender-to-
turkey-1000926526. 
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invidiously good bilateral relations was exposed to sudden opposite 
direction. Therefore, it is undeniable that the developments in the region 
especially the Russian warplane crisis have affected Turkey’s energy politics 
and caused speculations that Turkey would not even get adequate gas supply 
from Russia for itself. This paper, in contrary, argues that all these 
developments could transform Turkey’s energy politics in a way that it 
would limit its dependency on one source country.  
 In this sense, Turkey has accelerated its efforts to diversify gas 
suppliers in order to procure its energy security. Closeness of Turkey’s 
geostrategic position to alternative natural gas resources and its pragmatic 
initiatives has proved that Turkey has a high capacity to diversify its energy 
supply. In case of being an energy hub, Turkey’s potential still needs to be 
considered. In such conflict-ridden region, the most important feature of 
Turkey in the context of energy security is that Turkey is preserving its 
stability. Together with political stability of Turkey and secure routes, by 
increasing its storing capacity, Turkey can serve an uninterrupted availability 
of energy sources and at an affordable price. In conclusion Turkey’s position 
within energy politics is still promising.  
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